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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pleading is the cornerstone of our adversarial process. It serves 
as the gateway into the American civil justice system, establishes the 
legal issues in dispute, and shapes the subsequent scope of the 
litigation process.1 Perhaps no procedural development has been 
more fiercely debated than the United States Supreme Court’s 
announcement of a heightened “plausibility” pleading standard in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.3 Twombly and Iqbal 
retired the liberal notice pleading standard established under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was endorsed by the Court 
some fifty years earlier in Conley v. Gibson.4 
Recently, in Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., the Minnesota Supreme 
Court considered whether to adopt the “plausibility” standard in 
order to reconcile Minnesota’s pleading practice with the federal 
system in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal.5 The court declined to do 
so, favoring the simplified notice pleading standard it had 
embraced since the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were 
adopted in 1951.6 
To appreciate the importance of the Walsh decision, it is 
necessary to understand the purpose and function of pleading. 
This Note begins by tracing the history of pleading systems from 
the common law system,7 which initially influenced legal 
development in the United States, to the current system under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 This Note then discusses two 
relatively recent United States Supreme Court’s decisions, Twombly 
and Iqbal,9 and provides a historical overview of Minnesota’s 
pleading practice.10 Next, this Note analyzes the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision in Walsh11 and the resulting implications 
 
 1.  See Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. 
REV. 517, 517–18 (1925). 
 2.  550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 3.  556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
 4.  355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 5.  Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (Walsh III), 851 N.W.2d 598, 604–05 (Minn. 
2014). 
 6.  Id. at 604, 606. 
 7.  See infra Part II.A. 
 8.  See infra Part II.B. 
 9.  See infra Part II.C. 
 10.  See infra Part II.D. 
 11.  See infra Part III. 
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for Minnesota state courts.12 Finally, this Note argues that the 
notice pleading standard—as preserved by the Walsh court—better 
protects the founding principles of our modern civil justice system 
by promoting open access to the courts, equality among litigants, 
and consistency in the application of substantive law.13 
II. THE HISTORY OF PLEADING SYSTEMS 
A. Common Law Pleading 
In England, litigation occurred historically in a two-court 
system: “common law” courts and “equity” courts.14 Despite 
fundamental differences in each court’s function and procedural 
framework, common law and equity courts often worked in 
tandem.15 Equity courts, an extension of the king’s authority, 
sought to cure unjust results handed down by the common law 
courts.16 Compared to its common law counterpart, equity 
procedure was flexible.17 Many of the procedural reforms that 
occurred in this country during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were grounded in equity ideals.18 
The common law system evolved gradually over several 
centuries following the Norman Conquest of England.19 Originally 
 
 12.  See infra Part IV. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 14.  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914 (1987).  
 15.  Id.; see also 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 335–36 
(1926) (comparing and contrasting the procedural framework of equity and 
common law courts); Clark, supra note 1, at 525–29 (describing the different 
procedural characteristics of the common law and equity systems).  
 16.  Clark, supra note 1, at 528; see also Subrin, supra note 14, at 918 
(discussing the role of equity courts in relieving petitioners from unjust 
applications of the common law’s rigid system).  
 17.  Clark, supra note 1, at 528–29; see also 1 ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND 
SYSTEMS OF THE COMMON LAW 71–73 (P.F. Collier ed., 1939) (discussing the 
development of a flexible equity system in response to the overly rigid common 
law system); Subrin, supra note 14, at 920 (“Common law was the more confining, 
rigid, and predictable system; equity was more flexible, discretionary, and 
individualized.”). 
 18.  For an in-depth discussion of the equity system’s influence on procedural 
reforms in the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see 
generally Subrin, supra note 14. 
 19.  Clark, supra note 1, at 519; see also EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, CASES ON 
PROCEDURE ANNOTATED: COMMON LAW PLEADING 1 (1914). For a brief overview of 
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conducted orally, by the sixteenth century, pleading had become a 
formal, written exercise.20 The defining characteristics of common 
law procedure—the writ system and issue pleading—created a 
framework that was rigid in its application.21 
The writ system and issue pleading developed simultaneously 
at common law.22 A litigant seeking redress in the King’s Court was 
first required to procure a writ from the office of the chancellor.23 
In issuing the writ, the king ordered the defendant to appear and 
conferred jurisdiction to a specific court.24 Plaintiffs seeking writs 
often presented similar facts and theories of relief, making it 
convenient to “designate similar causes of action . . . by the same 
name.”25 Gradually, a defined set of “forms of action,” or writs, were 
developed—each with their own “distinct procedural 
characteristics.”26 As the number of distinct forms grew, “[t]he 
process of issuing writs came to be strictly limited to cases where 
precedent existed, so that a litigant had to bring his claim within 
the limits set by some former precedent.”27 By the fourteenth 
century, the process of developing new writs had ceased.28 
To prevail at common law, a plaintiff was required to select the 
correct form of action.29 This choice often proved difficult as 
 
the development of English law before the Norman Conquest, see 1 POUND, supra 
note 17, at 24–30.  
 20.  9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 331; see also Clark, supra note 1, at 517–
18; Peter Julian, Note, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism of 
Generality,” 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1184 (2010).  
 21.  See Clark, supra note 1, at 527; see also Subrin, supra note 14, at 914–17 
(discussing the identifying characteristics of the common law system and noting 
overtime the common law system became too rigid in its application). 
 22.  See Subrin, supra note 14, at 914–17. For a discussion of the evolution of 
the writ system in England, see SUNDERLAND, supra note 19, at 1–7.  
 23.  Clark, supra note 1, at 527; see also 1 POUND, supra note 17, at 38; Subrin, 
supra note 14, at 915. 
 24.  Clark, supra note 1, at 527. 
 25.  JOHN JAY MCKELVEY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 4 (New York, 
Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1894). 
 26.  Subrin, supra note 14, at 915; see also 1 POUND, supra note 17, at 38 (“By 
the seventeenth century an elaborate system of writs had grown up, corresponding 
to the actions and proceedings which could be brought in the common-law 
courts.”). 
 27.  Clark, supra note 1, at 527. The common forms of action became 
“trespass, trespass on the case, trover, replevin and detinue in tort; and covenant, 
debt, account and assumpsit in contract.” Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of 
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several of the writs overlapped.30 Ultimately, the form selected by 
the plaintiff dictated the entire course of the lawsuit.31 It 
determined the governing law, “set forth the facts the plaintiff had 
to allege and prove,” established “the procedures the court would 
follow in deciding the case,” and dictated the remedy available.32 
Having selected the form of action, the parties then 
exchanged a series of pleadings back and forth, denying or 
affirming, until a single issue—either of law or fact—was reached.33 
Hence, at common law, pleading was efficient—producing only a 
single issue requiring resolution by a judge or jury.34 Where the 
issue was one of fact, a jury trial was necessary. However, in 
resolving only a single issue, juries played a limited role.35 A judge, 
on the other hand, resolved an issue of law in the absence of a jury 
trial.36 
Despite its efficiency, issue pleading, as it became known, often 
proved “deficient in deciding cases accurately and justly on the 
merits” as parties frequently saw their claims dismissed based on 
legal technicalities.37 Forced to prematurely select the form of 
action, plaintiffs often later discovered facts that would bar their 
claim.38 The facts discovered may have supported a different claim; 
however, it was too late as the parties had already narrowed the 
single issue that would determine their dispute.39 Defendants, 
frequently relying only on a plaintiff’s fictitious assertions, knew 
 
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986); see also James R. Maxeiner, 
Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, a 
Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 1271 
(2010). 
 30.  Julian, supra note 20, at 1184. 
 31.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1271. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Clark, supra note 1, at 526; Marcus, supra note 29, at 437; Subrin, supra 
note 14, at 916. 
 34.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1272; see also Marcus, supra note 29, at 437. 
 35.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1272. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.; see also Clark, supra note 1, at 528 (arguing that the development of 
the “highly technical” common law system rarely provided litigants with “complete 
relief”); Marcus, supra note 29, at 437 (“As [common law] pleading practice 
prospered, decisions on the merits became increasingly infrequent.”).  
 38.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1272. 
 39.  Id. 
5
Sheran: Diverging Paths: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Reject
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
  
2015] “PLAUSIBILITY” PLEADING STANDARD REJECTED 1659 
little if anything about the basis of the claim and “would remain in 
the dark until trial because discovery was limited or nonexistent.”40 
By the nineteenth century, the substantive law contained in 
the forms of action became unsuitable for the “vast commercial 
developments” of the English and American economies.41 The 
stagnate body of substantive law contained in the writs forced 
parties to “fit contemporary facts into obsolete forms.”42 Gradually, 
presenting even the simplest of grievances required a plaintiff “to 
use highly stylized verbal formulations” or risk dismissal of their 
claim.43 
Public discontent with issue pleading’s rigid formality grew, 
and by the nineteenth century, a reformation movement aimed at 
simplifying the pleading process was undertaken both in England 
and in the United States.44 
B. From Code Pleading to Notice Pleading 
1. Code Pleading Reform in the United States 
In 1847, David Dudley Field—together with fifty members of 
the New York bar—appealed to the New York State Legislature 
“that a radical reform of legal procedure in all its departments 
[was] demanded by the interests of justice and by the voice of the 
people.”45 Having adopted a new constitution the previous year, the 
New York State Legislature was directed to appoint three 
commissioners “to revise, reform, simplify and abridge” the 
pleading standard and legal practices of the state.46 
The following year, the Commission to Reform Procedure—
led by David Dudley Field—submitted the first installment of the 
Code of Civil Procedure.47 The code was adopted by the New York 
 
 40.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 437. 
 41.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1272. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 437.  
 44.  Id. at 438. For a brief overview of the reformation movement both in 
England and the United States, see Clark, supra note 1, at 529–37. 
 45.  David Dudley Field, Memorial to the Legislature (Feb. 1847), in 1 
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 261, 261 
(A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884). 
 46.  N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 24 (repealed 1850), available at http://ny 
constitution.org/content/third-constitution-new-york-1846.  
 47.  David Dudley Field, First Report of the Practice Commission (Feb. 29, 
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State Legislature in 1848 and became known informally as the 
“Field Code.”48 
In response to the labyrinth the pleading process had become 
at common law, “[t]he major goal of the Field Code was to 
facilitate the swift, economic, and predictable enforcement of 
discrete, carefully articulated rights”49 and to end judicial decisions 
on the basis of mere technicalities.50 The Field Code unified law 
and equity and abolished the intricate common law forms of 
action.51 In its place, the Field Code provided “one form of action, 
for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress 
or prevention of private wrongs.”52 This single, blended “form of 
action [was] to be known as the civil action.”53 Importantly, the Field 
Code “provided the same procedure for all types of cases, 
regardless of substantive law, [or] the number of issues and 
parties.”54 It rejected the common law’s “stylized search for a single 
issue”55 and instead required parties to state the facts in a clear and 
concise manner.56 In contrast to the issue pleading required under 
the common law, there was to be fact pleading under the Field 
 
1848), in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY 
FIELD, supra note 45, at 262, 262; see also Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An 
Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 3, 9 (A. Reppy ed., 1949). 
 48.  Field Code, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497; see also Clark, supra note 1, at 
533; Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1273; Pound, supra note 47, at 10. 
 49.  Subrin, supra note 14, at 934–35. 
 50.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 438; see also DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL 
BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS? (1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, 
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, supra note 45, at  
226, 226 (“We have ten different forms of action, each with its peculiar technical 
language. A mistake in the form of action is generally fatal to the case.”). 
 51.  Clark, supra note 1, at 533; see also Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1273. 
 52.  Field Code, ch. 379, § 62, 1848 N.Y. Laws at 510. 
 53.  Clark, supra note 1, at 533 (emphasis in original); see also Field Code, ch. 
379, § 62, 1848 N.Y. Laws at 510; Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1925) [hereinafter Clark, Union of Law]. 
 54.  Subrin, supra note 14, at 933–34. 
 55.  Id. at 934; see also Marcus, supra note 29, at 437–38 (discussing the Field 
Code’s rejection of the common law’s overly technical issue pleading system in 
favor of a simplified pleading system). 
 56.  Field Code, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws at 521. (“A complaint shall 
contain: A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and 
concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person 
of common understanding to know what is intended.”); see also Clark, supra note 1, 
at 533 (“[I]t was planned that the parties should in their pleading state the facts in 
simple and concise form.”).   
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Code.57 In effect, this eradicated the danger of premature choice 
that plagued the common law system.58 
Beginning with Missouri in 1849, the system established by the 
Field Code spread across the United States, reaching Minnesota—
an early adopter—in 1851.59 Within twenty-five years of its 
enactment, code pleading was adopted by twenty-four states.60 In 
total, thirty American jurisdictions embraced the Field Code in 
some form.61 
Despite its focus on brevity and clarity, the Field Code was not 
without its own problems. Abolishing the common law’s forms of 
action and its single-issue formation requirement led to the 
proliferation of issues without a “satisfactory provision for their 
narrowing.”62 This “[p]roliferation . . . not only multiplied the 
number of issues that courts had to address but presented many 
opportunities for surprises at trial, when litigants raised facts that 
their adversaries had not anticipated or created legal issues that 
they had not expected.”63 In McFaul v. Ramsey, a case involving a 
dozen causes of action, the United States Supreme Court remarked 
that code pleading had “destroy[ed] the certainty and simplicity of 
all pleadings, and introduce[d] on the record an endless wrangle 
in writing, perplexing to the court, delaying and impeding the 
administration of justice.”64 
To address this issue, Field and the other Commissioners for 
procedural reform advocated for the codification of substantive 
law.65 However, the Commission’s Civil Code was not adopted—
 
 57.  Clark, supra note 1, at 543 (“If the common law may be termed issue 
pleading, since its main purpose was the framing of an issue, code pleading may be 
referred to as fact pleading in view of the great emphasis placed under the [Field 
Code] upon getting the facts stated.”). 
 58.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1274. 
 59.  Id. at 534; see also Charles A. Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 
F.R.D. 85, 103–04 (1960) (“Few, if any, jurisdictions have enjoyed so continuously 
satisfactory systems of procedure as has Minnesota. The Field Code was adopted 
there in 1851 . . . and was interpreted sympathetically by the courts of the state, in 
contrast to the hostility toward the code . . . in many other jurisdictions.”).  
 60.  Clark, supra note 1, at 534. 
 61.  Pound, supra note 47, at 10 (“Some thirty American jurisdictions adopted 
the Code of Civil Procedure with changes and additions seldom for the better and 
often not well advised.”); see also 1 POUND, supra note 17, at 80–81. 
 62.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1274. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857). 
 65.  See, e.g., David Dudley Field, First Report of the Code Commission (Feb. 
8
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passing the State Assembly three times only to fail in the Senate or 
be vetoed by the Governor.66 If Field and the other Commissioners 
had successfully codified substantive law, it was presumed that “the 
number of possible causes of action would have been 
circumscribed and their content better defined.”67 
By 1850, enthusiasm for legal reform had faded in New York 
and the Act that created the Commission to Reform Procedure was 
repealed.68 Ultimately, the procedural reform sought by Field and 
the Commission failed, as code pleading did not simplify the 
litigation process in the way its advocates envisioned.69 Many 
attributed this early failure to “judicial sabotage.”70 
2. A New Movement 
By the end of the nineteenth century, discontent with the 
American legal system was again growing. At the annual ABA 
convention of 1906, Roscoe Pound, then dean of the Nebraska 
College of Law and the future dean of Harvard Law School, 
 
27, 1858), in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY 
FIELD, supra note 45, at 309, 309–14; see also Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1274. 
 66.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1275. 
 67.  Id. at 1274–75. 
 68.  Pound, supra note 47, at 9. 
 69.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1276 (“By the early twentieth century, at one 
extreme, code pleading was little better than common law pleading: parties were 
subjected to premature issue narrowing. At the other extreme, the number of 
issues was boundless, unknowable, and productive of surprise at trial.”). 
 70.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 438 (“The high hopes for the Field Code were 
not realized. In part, one may attribute this failure to judicial sabotage.”); see also 
McArthur v. Moffet, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (Wis. 1910).  
The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code 
received from the New York judges is matter of history. They had been 
bred under the common-law rules of pleading and taught to regard 
that system as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with suspicion a 
system which was heralded as so simple that every man would be able 
to draw his own pleadings. They proceeded by construction to import 
into the Code rules and distinctions from the common-law system to 
such an extent that in a few years they had practically so changed it 
that it could hardly be recognized by its creators.  
Id.; see also Clark, Union of Law, supra note 53, at 2–3 (“Many of the early         
judges . . . bitterly objected to the principles of the Code.”); Subrin, supra note 14, 
at 940 (stating that some judges ignored the merger of law and equity completely 
while others continued to interpret the complaint in terms of the common law 
forms of action).  
9
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delivered a famous address calling, once again, for procedural 
reform.71 
In Pound’s view, code pleading, like common law pleading 
before it, had become rigid, diminishing the role of the judiciary.72 
Pound believed that American judges—hampered by an inflexible 
procedural system—had been reduced to umpires, officiating over 
parties as to the “rules of the game” and unable to “search 
independently for truth and justice.”73 He argued that the system’s 
complicated framework incentivized lawyers to take advantage of 
procedural technicalities, hindering the logical and just resolution 
of disputes.74 
Pound advocated for a system that was more conducive to the 
administration of justice by removing procedural interference with 
the evolution of substantive law.75 Following Pound’s 1906 address, 
the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate 
Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in 
Litigation, more commonly known as the “Committee of Fifteen,” 
was created by the ABA.76 
In 1911, Thomas W. Shelton, a lawyer from Virginia, began a 
campaign of “well-organized propaganda”77 calling for the uniform 
 
 71.  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906). 
 72.  See Subrin, supra note 14, at 947. 
 73.  Pound, supra note 71, at 405; see also Subrin, supra note 14, at 945 (stating 
Pound believed that “it was the formalism of the common law writ system and its 
rigid and inflexible procedural steps that hindered the just application of 
substantive law and the adjustment of law to modern circumstances” and that “the 
judge should be left relatively unhampered to make law and decide cases”). 
 74.  Subrin, supra note 14, at 945 (citing Pound, supra note 71, at 404). 
 75.  See Roscoe Pound, The Etiquette of Justice, 3 PROC. NEB. ST. B. ASS’N 231, 
249 (1908) (“It might well be maintained, indeed, that as between arbitrary action 
of the law in nearly all cases, because of the complexity of procedure, and arbitrary 
action of the judge in some cases, the latter would be preferable.”); see also Subrin, 
supra note 14, at 945 (discussing the themes of Pound’s 1906 address and stating 
that procedural law “should not intermesh with substantive law and help deliver 
that law”).   
 76.  Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1045–46 (1981); see also Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and 
Remedial Procedure, 32 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 491, 491 (1909); Report of the Committee on 
Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 503, 503 (1908); 
Subrin, supra note 14, at 946 (noting Pound was appointed to the “Committee of 
Fifteen” after its inception). 
 77.  Thomas W. Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure—Let Congress Set the Supreme 
Court Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 319 (1911).  
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/2
  
1664 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:5 
regulation of judicial procedure by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.78 To Shelton, only the Supreme Court could pave 
the path to national uniformity.79 Later that year, Shelton 
introduced a resolution calling for judicial uniformity at the annual 
ABA conference.80 The resolution was adopted, creating the 
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure81 and beginning a 
procedural uniformity movement that would last more than twenty 
years.82 
Shelton’s vision for a unified procedural system led by the 
Supreme Court was not realized during his lifetime. In 1934, four 
years after his death, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act—
empowering the Supreme Court to disseminate a uniform 
procedural system to be known as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.83 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Act eleven 
days later.84 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 319–20. 
 80.  See Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, 
35 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 434, 434–35 (1912).  
 81.  Id. at 435.  
 82.  Charles Clark, discussing the reformation movement, later remarked: 
It was the culmination of one of the most persistent and sustained 
campaigns for law improvement conducted in [the United States], one 
sponsored by the American Bar Association since 1912, under the 
militant leadership of Mr. Thomas W. Shelton and his Committee on 
Uniform Judicial Procedure, and supported by some of the most 
distinguished of the legal profession. 
Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 
388 (1935). For a detailed overview of the reformation process from Pound’s 1906 
address to the formation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Burbank, 
supra note 76, at 1045–97. 
 83.  The Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, indicated that “[t]he Supreme 
Court of the United States shall have the power to proscribe, by general rules, for 
the district courts of the United States and for the District of Columbia, the forms 
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and procedure in civil 
actions at law.” Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 
1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
 84.  Burbank, supra note 76, at 1097. Upon signing the Rules Enabling Act, 
President Roosevelt called the Act “one of the most important steps ever taken in 
the improvement of our judicial system” and remarked “[f]or the complicated 
procedure of the past, we now propose to substitute a simplified, flexible, 
scientific, correlated system of procedural rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing Bill to Give the Supreme Court 
Power to Regulate Procedure in the Federal Courts (June 19, 1934), in 3 THE 
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3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The following year, Charles E. Clark, dean of the Yale Law 
School, was appointed Reporter to the Supreme Court’s Advisory 
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure.85 In total, the Supreme 
Court appointed fourteen prominent lawyers and law professors 
from across the country to the committee charged with drafting the 
Federal Rules.86 Within three years, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure became law.87 
Having devoted his career to the practice of civil procedure, 
Clark was all too familiar with past failures.88 Clark applauded code 
pleading for unifying law and equity and eradicating the intricate 
forms of action found at common law.89 He argued, however, that 
code pleading “had failed . . . to substitute fact pleading for the 
common law issue pleading.”90 
Like David Dudley Field before him, Clark envisioned a system 
where disputes were resolved only on the merits, not procedural 
technicalities.91 Early in the drafting process, Clark advocated for a 
system void of pleading motions.92 This view did not prevail.93 The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did, however, significantly 
minimize the role of pleadings, creating a more simplified, liberal 
standard than its predecessor.94 
 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 303, 303–04 (1938). 
 85.  Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976); Subrin, supra note 14, at 961. 
 86.  Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 
447, 447 (1936).  
 87.  Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts, 24 
A.B.A. J. 97, 97–98 (1938). 
 88.  See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 14, at 973 (“For Clark, procedural history was 
a sort of morality play in which the demon, procedural technicality, keeps trying to 
thwart a regal substantive law administered by regal judges.”).  
 89.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1277. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See Marcus, supra note 29, at 439; Smith, supra note 85, at 916 (discussing 
Clark’s “cardinal virtues” that “cases would be decided on the merits rather than 
by procedural rulings, and this would occur with an economy of time and 
resources”). 
 92.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 439. 
 93.  See id.   
 94.  See id. at 440 (“The liberality of the pleading requirements is reflected 
throughout the Federal Rules.”); Subrin, supra note 14, at 942–43 (noting that the 
English pleading system was more simple and liberal than the Field Code and that 
this approach was incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also 
12
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In Clark’s view, less should be expected of litigants at the 
pleading process.95 He realized that in order to state with precision 
a legal claim, the litigant was often forced to rely on information 
gained during the discovery process.96 To Clark, pleadings should 
assist—not restrain—the application of substantive law.97 
In the end, Clark’s liberal view triumphed.98 Pleadings under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now require only “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”99 To circumvent the complexity of code pleading, “Rule 
8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases 
‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’ and ‘cause of action.’”100 Hence, Rule 8, as 
 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“The liberal notice 
pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which 
was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Henry S. Noyes, Rise of 
Common Law of Federal Pleading, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 861 (2012) (noting that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a more liberal pleading standard).   
 95.  See Clark, supra note 1, at 543 (“We still expect something of pleading but 
are more disposed to realize that there are difficulties in the way of complete 
achievement of its ends.”). 
 96.  Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 1277 (citing Charles E. Clark, The Complaint 
in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259, 260 (1926)).   
 97.  Clark, supra note 1, at 542 (“Pleading should perform the office only of 
aiding in the enforcement of substantive legal relations. It should not limit the 
operation of the general law which defines rights and duties, privileges and powers 
of individuals, but should aid in the enforcement of such relations. It is a means to 
an end, not an end in itself—the ‘handmaid rather than the mistress’ of justice.”). 
 98.  See Subrin, supra note 14, at 973; see also Clark, supra note 86, at 450. In 
support of the proposed Federal Rules, Clark stated: 
The requirements of pleading and allegation should not be strict, so 
that no person shall be deprived of his rights by the chance act or 
ignorance of his lawyer. But if there results any indefiniteness about 
the issues or the points in dispute, it can be cleared up effectively (as 
no purely pleading rule has ever succeeded in accomplishing) by those 
devices of discovery and summary judgment. 
Id. 
 99.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 100.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 439. “To make the point clearer, the drafters 
prepared a series of form complaints that were by definition sufficient to satisfy the 
new standard. These forms were startlingly brief.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. Form 
9); see also Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 12 (1938) 
(discussing the intentional omission of the word “fact” and stating “[t]he reason 
for that is, nobody knows what ‘facts’ are; courts have been trying for five hundred 
years to find ‘facts’ and nobody has ever been able to draw a line between what 
were and what were not ‘facts’”).  
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drafted, did not require a plaintiff to allege specific facts,101 but 
rather required a complaint only “provide notice to the defendant 
of the plaintiff’s claims and the grounds on which they rest.”102 This 
more liberal standard became known as notice pleading.103 
Notice pleading—considered the bedrock of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure—was not the only major development.104 The 
Federal Rules also provided for the more liberal joinder of parties 
and the expansion of discovery.105 Together, these innovations 
dramatically altered the legal system in the United States.106 
Although generally well received, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were not without their detractors in the years following 
their passage. Some argued that the liberal discovery provisions 
contained in the Federal Rules would be abused, which would 
result in “speculative litigation.”107 Others believed that the Federal 
Rules gave judges too much discretion in managing the litigation 
process.108 Still others who favored the revival of code pleading 
called for the extinction of notice pleading altogether.109 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“[T]he Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon 
which he bases his claim.”), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
 102.  Noyes, supra note 94, at 857; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 
U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citing Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47) (“[P]etitioner’s complaint 
easily satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair 
notice of the basis for petitioner’s claims.”); Sunderland, supra note 100, at 12 
(discussing the pleading standard under the Federal Rules and proclaiming that 
“[t]he test is whether information is given sufficient to enable the party to plead 
and to prepare for trial”). 
 103.  See, e.g., Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 104.  Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a 
Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1191, 1204 (2010). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the 
Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 22 
A.B.A. J. 809, 809 (1936); see also Marcus, supra note 29, at 445–46 (“Plaintiffs have 
an incentive to plead vaguely in hopes that discovery will turn up material on 
which to base a more specific charge.”).  
 108.  See Finch, supra note 107, at 817. 
 109.  See Marcus, supra note 29, at 445 (discussing the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals “guerilla attack” on notice pleadings in the 1950s and stating that the 
court “urged that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to revive code pleading by requiring 
the plaintiff to allege ‘the facts constituting a cause of action’”).  
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/2
  
1668 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:5 
With its 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson,110 the Supreme Court 
firmly embraced the “new liberal ethos” of notice pleading—
quelling the effort to revive code pleading.111 In Conley, the Court 
announced that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief.”112 The Court went on to hold that so long as the 
complaint gave notice to the defendant as to the nature of the 
claim, specific facts need not be alleged.113 For the next fifty years, 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language became the “rallying cry”114 of 
notice pleading—establishing a hurdle far lower than its 
predecessor.115 
C. From Conley to Twombly and Iqbal 
The low hurdle embraced by the Conley Court remained 
unscathed for fifty years despite attempts by lower courts to require 
a heightened pleading standard.116 On several occasions during this 
period, the Supreme Court declared its preference for legislative 
action—not judicial action—as the means to bring about reform to 
the pleading process.117 The Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,118 however, marked a decisively different path in 
 
 110.  355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
 111.  Marcus, supra note 29, at 433–40.   
 112.  Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 113.  Id. at 47–48. 
 114.  Julian, supra note 20, at 1189. 
 115.  Campbell, supra note 104, at 1206 (“Conley was understood to mean that 
the federal rules required far less than [code] pleading.”).  
 116.  See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 5 F. App’x 63, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(requiring a heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases), 
rev’d, 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence      
& Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring a heightened 
pleading standard in civil rights cases against municipalities under 42 U.S.C.          
§ 1983), rev’d, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 117.  See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 
168); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[O]ur cases 
demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment 
are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process 
or the legislative process.”); Campbell, supra note 104, at 1212. 
 118.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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the evolving interpretation of pleading requirements—retiring the 
liberal standard set by Conley fifty years earlier.119 
1. Twombly: The Birth of the “Plausibility” Standard 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, consumers brought a class 
action lawsuit alleging the defendants, telecommunications 
companies, had conspired to restrain trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act.120 The plaintiffs alleged that “parallel conduct” by the 
defendants demonstrated the existence of an anti-competitive 
conspiracy.121 The Supreme Court noted that an illegal agreement 
between the defendants was not the only explanation for the 
parallel conduct—implying instead that the conduct at issue was 
consistent with “rational and competitive business strategy.”122 
The Court concluded that by relying only on a “conclusory” 
allegation of conspiracy, the plaintiffs had failed to plead any facts 
that indicated a plausibility that illegal behavior had occurred.123 
Interpreting and effectively rejecting the standard set by Conley, the 
Court held “that a plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”124 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that the claim must be dismissed because 
plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions had failed to “nudge[] their claims 
across the line from conceivable to plausible.”125 
In deciding Twombly, the Court “imposed an entirely new test 
on the pleading stage, instituting a judicial inquiry into the 
pleading’s convincingness.”126 The Court expressly denied, 
however, that the new test required a judicial assessment of a 
claim’s probability of success.127 Considered by most to be a clear 
break from the liberal standard established by Conley,128 Twombly left 
 
 119.  Campbell, supra note 104, at 1212.  
 120.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 
 121.  Id. at 550. 
 122.  Id. at 553–54. 
 123.  Id. at 556–57. 
 124.  Noyes, supra note 94, at 867 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  
 125.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 126.  Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 827 (2010). 
 127.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (“Asking for plausible grounds does not 
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough 
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 
agreement.”). 
 128.  See, e.g., id. at 577–82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
16
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many questions unanswered—particularly, the question of whether 
the heightened pleading standard announced was limited to 
antitrust actions.129 
2.  Iqbal: “Plausibility” Confirmed 
Two years after deciding Twombly, the Court revisited its new 
“plausibility” standard. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court demonstrated 
that the “plausibility” standard applied to all federal civil 
complaints, not just complaints asserting antitrust violations.130 
Iqbal involved a Pakistani Muslim arrested in the United States 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.131 Claiming 
that “he was deprived of various constitutional protections while in 
federal custody,” Javaid Iqbal “filed a complaint against numerous 
federal officials, including John Ashcroft, the former Attorney 
General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”132 The complaint alleged that 
Ashcroft and Mueller had “adopted an unconstitutional policy that 
subjected [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement on account 
of his race, religion, or national origin.”133 
Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing 
Iqbal had failed to allege specific facts demonstrating their 
involvement in the purported unconstitutional conduct.134 Relying 
on the “no set of facts” standard set by Conley, the district court 
denied the motion.135 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied the “plausibility” standard just established by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly, but nevertheless affirmed the 
lower court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.136  
 
 129.  E.g., id. at 596 (“Whether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants 
in antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a 
complaint will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the 
future will answer.”). 
 130.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 131.  Id. at 666. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 669. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 669–70. While an appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 669–70. 
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In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court noted 
that the defendants’ status as high-ranking government officials 
precluded a finding of liability “for the unconstitutional conduct of 
their subordinates.”137 Consequently, the Court found that to 
prevail, Iqbal had to “plead sufficient factual matter to show that 
[Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and implemented the detention 
policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the 
purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national 
origin.”138 
Applying the “plausibility” standard set by Twombly, the Court 
concluded that Iqbal’s claim that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him] to 
harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on 
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin” was 
conclusory and unworthy of an assumption of truth.139 The Court 
then found that Iqbal’s remaining allegations did not make 
plausible the claim that the defendants subjected him to harsh 
conditions of confinement because of—and not in spite of—his 
religion, race, or national origin.140 
Again, the Court expressly denied that a claim’s probability of 
success was a determining factor for the district courts to analyze.141 
Instead, the Court noted, determining plausibility is a “context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense”142 to establish whether the 
substance of non-conclusory factual allegations “allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”143 
D. Minnesota’s Pleading Standard 
Following the 1938 enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Minnesota Judicial Council recommended the 
adoption of the Federal Rules into state practice.144 For the next 
 
 137.  Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 675–76. 
 138.  Id. at 677. 
 139.  Id. at 680 (internal citations omitted).  
 140.  Id. at 681–83.  
 141.  Id. at 678. 
 142.  Id. at 679. 
 143.  Id. at 663, 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 
(2007)). 
 144.  NEIL B. DAVIDSON, PIRSIG ON MINNESOTA PLEADING § 1.01 (Matthew 
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decade, however, the recommendation was generally ignored.145 It 
was not until 1947 that the Minnesota Legislature conceded 
authority to the Minnesota Supreme Court to promulgate a 
uniform system of civil procedure for Minnesota state courts.146 
Four years later, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure—based 
largely on the Federal Rules—were adopted.147 
Like its federal counterpart,148 Minnesota Rule 8.01 required a 
complaint to “contain a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”149 This language has 
remained unchanged since the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted in 1951.150 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first interpreted the language 
of Rule 8.01 in First National Bank of Henning v. Olson.151 In Olson, 
the court found: “[T]here is no justification for dismissing a 
complaint for insufficiency . . . unless it appears to a certainty that 
the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of the claim.”152 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court expanded its understanding of Rule 8.01 in 
Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin.153 The Franklin court explained: 
One of the fundamental changes intended by the 
adoption of our Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly as 
embodied in Rule 8, was to permit the pleading of events 
by way of a broad general statement which may express 
 
Bender ed., 6th ed. 2014). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  See MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (1949). 
The Supreme Court of this state shall have the power to regulate the 
pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in civil actions in 
all courts of this state, other than the probate courts, by rules 
promulgated by it from time to time. Such rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 
Id. 
 147.  See Maynard E. Pirsig, Introduction to Symposium: The Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 36 MINN. L. REV. 565, 565 (1952).  
 148.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 149.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01 (1952) (amended 1985, revised 1988). 
 150.  Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01, with MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01 (1952) (amended 
1985, revised 1988). 
 151.  246 Minn. 28, 74 N.W.2d 123 (1955). 
 152.  Id. at 38, 74 N.W.2d at 129 (quoting Dennis v. Vill. of Tonka Bay, 151 
F.2d 411, 412 (8th Cir. 1945)).  
 153.  265 Minn. 391, 122 N.W.2d 26 (1963). 
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conclusions rather than, as was required under code 
pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action. . . . No longer is a pleader required to 
allege facts and every element of a cause of action. A 
claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss . . . if it is 
possible on any evidence which might be produced . . . to 
grant the relief demanded. To state it another way, under 
this rule a pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a 
certainty that no facts, which could be introduced 
consistent with the pleading, exist which would support 
granting the relief demanded.154 
The Franklin court’s interpretation of Rule 8.01 echoed the 
“no set of facts” standard endorsed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Conley.155 In the four years following Iqbal, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not formally endorse or reject the “plausibility” 
standard. This changed with the court’s decision in Walsh v. U.S. 
Bank.156 
III. THE WALSH DECISION 
A. Factual Background 
Despite its sweeping ramifications for Minnesota courts, the 
factual background of Walsh v. U.S. Bank157 is fairly unremarkable. 
Plaintiff Laura Walsh “defaulted on her mortgage.”158 U.S. Bank, 
the mortgage holder, “began a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding” 
against the property.159 U.S. Bank served a notice of the foreclosure 
sale upon an “adult ‘Jane Doe’ who occupied the [p]roperty” but 
refused to identify herself or open the door to accept service.160 The 
 
 154.  Id. at 394–95, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 155.  See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text. 
 156.  Walsh III, 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014). 
 157.  Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (Walsh I), No. 27-CV-12-25292, 2013 WL 
9862192 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2013), rev’d, No. A13-0742, 2013 WL 6050427 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2013), aff’d 851 N.W.2d 598. 
 158.  Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (Walsh II ), No. A13-0742, 2013 WL 6050427, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2013). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Walsh I, 2013 WL 9862192, at *1. 
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notice was left at Walsh’s door.161 On April 2, 2012, the property was 
sold at a foreclosure sale.162 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
Walsh sued U.S. Bank asserting the foreclosure sale was 
defective because of improper service.163 Walsh denied that the Jane 
Doe identified in the affidavit of service was, in fact, her, and 
argued service was improper because the notice of foreclosure was 
never physically accepted.164 U.S. Bank moved to dismiss, pursuant 
to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e),165 claiming Walsh 
had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.166 The 
district court held that service was proper as the Jane Doe, an adult 
female of suitable age, occupied the property on the day of service.167 
“[T]he fact that ‘Jane Doe’ refused to physically accept the papers” 
was of no consequence.168 The district court then concluded that 
“[a]ll of the appropriately considered facts fail to establish 
improper service.”169 Adopting the “plausibility” standard 
announced in Twombly and affirmed in Iqbal, the district court held 
that Walsh “failed to establish any evidence or facts giving rise to a 
plausible claim for relief” and dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice.170 
Walsh appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.171 The 
court of appeals focused its inquiry on the plain language of 
Minnesota’s personal service requirements under Rule 4.03(a).172 
 
 161.  Walsh II, 2013 WL 6050427, at *1. 
 162.  Walsh I, 2013 WL 9862192, at *1. 
 163.  See Walsh II, 2013 WL 6050427, at *1. 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e) is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Compare id. R. 12(b)(6) (“Failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted . . . .”), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e) (“Failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .”).  
 166.  See Walsh I, 2013 WL 9862192, at *1. 
 167.  See id. at *2.   
 168.  Id. (citing Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737, 739 
(1963)).  
 169.  Id.   
 170.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76 
(Minn. 2010)). 
 171.  Walsh II, No. A13-0742, 2013 WL 6050427 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 
2013), aff’d, 851 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 2014). 
 172.  See id. at *2–3. 
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Under Rule 4.03(a), the court of appeals noted, substitute service 
requires serving a person “residing” at the “usual place of abode” of 
the individual to be served.173 The affidavit of service, however, 
referred to the Jane Doe as an “occupant of the premises without 
addressing whether Jane Doe resided at the premises.”174 Walsh 
asserted, at the time of service, the only people residing at the 
residence were Walsh and her roommate.175 Accordingly, the court 
of appeals—declining to apply the “plausibility” standard—reversed 
the district court’s decision and concluded that “if Walsh might be 
able to produce evidence demonstrating that Jane Doe did not 
reside at the premises . . . the dismissal . . . was improper.”176   
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide a 
question left unresolved by its jurisprudence in the wake of Twombly 
and Iqbal: whether the “plausibility” standard established by the 
United States Supreme Court applied to civil pleadings filed in 
Minnesota state courts.177 The court’s opinion focused on the plain 
language, purpose, and history of Minnesota’s pleading standard 
under Rule 8.01.178 
Interpreting the plain language of Rule 8.01, the court 
rejected U.S. Bank’s assertion that the words “showing” and 
“entitled” provided textual support for the “plausibility” standard.179 
In defining each term, the court concluded that under Rule 8.01, a 
claimant must only “make some sort of demonstration that the 
claimant has a legal right to relief.”180 “Noticeably absent” from 
Rule 8.01 and the rest of Minnesota’s Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
court remarked, was the word “plausible.”181 The court determined 
that the plain language of the rule required something less and 
“decline[d] to engraft the plausibility standard” into its traditional 
 
 173.  Id. at *2 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a)).  
 174.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  Walsh III, 851 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Minn. 2014). 
 178.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 179.  Walsh III, 851 N.W.2d at 603–04. 
 180.  Id. at 604. 
 181.  Id.  
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interpretation of Rule 8.01, asserting that to do so would violate a 
basic rule of statutory interpretation.182 
Turning to the purpose and history of Rule 8.01, the court 
declared the state’s “preference for non-technical, broad-brush 
pleadings.”183 This preference, the court argued, was evident in its 
adoption of Rule 8.01, which allowed pleading by way of broad 
general statements giving notice to the opposing party as to the 
grounds of the claim—a less demanding standard than was 
required under the code pleading system.184 The court reasoned 
that, in contrast to Rule 8.01’s preference for “non-technical, 
broad-brush pleadings,” the “plausibility” standard demanded 
something more—“factual enhancement”—which set the two 
standards in direct conflict.185 
Based on Rule 8.01’s plain language, purpose, and history, the 
court declined to overrule its decisions in Olson and Franklin and 
reaffirmed its traditional notice pleading standard for civil actions 
in Minnesota state courts.186 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
In Walsh, the petitioners urged the Minnesota Supreme Court 
to adopt the “plausibility” standard in order to reconcile 
Minnesota’s pleading practice with the federal system in the wake 
of Twombly and Iqbal.187 By declining to do so, the Walsh court’s 
decision created a clear rift between federal and state pleading 
practice in Minnesota. 
As the Walsh court noted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the interpretations of those rules by federal courts are not 
binding on state courts.188 In an attempt to create national 
uniformity, however, many states—including Minnesota—have 
historically followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their 
subsequent federal court interpretations.189 At the time Twombly was 
 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 604–05. 
 185.  Id. at 605. 
 186.  Id. at 606. 
 187.  Id. at 604–05. 
 188.  Id. at 603.  
 189.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
John P. Sullivan, Do the New Pleading Standards Set out in Twombly and Iqbal Meet the 
Needs of the Replica Jurisdictions?, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 75 (2014); see also Roger 
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decided, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia modeled 
their pleading requirements after the federal practice.190 
Since Iqbal, there has been a schism among these 
jurisdictions.191 Some have fully embraced Iqbal, adopting the 
“plausibility” test into their local pleading practice.192 Others have 
cited Twombly and Iqbal but stopped short of adopting the 
heightened standard.193 Some jurisdictions, like Minnesota, have 
declined to adopt or affirmatively rejected the “plausibility” 
 
Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things To Come: The Great Split Between Federal and State 
Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109–10 (2010); Z.W. Julius Chen, 
Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (2008). 
 190.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (“Taking their cues from the federal courts, 
[twenty-six] [s]tates and the District of Columbia utilize as their standard for 
dismissal . . . the very language the majority repudiates: whether it appears 
‘beyond doubt’ that ‘no set of facts’ in support of the claim would entitle the 
plaintiff to relief.”). 
 191.  For a state-by-state overview of which jurisdictions have adopted or 
rejected the “plausibility” standard, or not addressed the issue at all, see Sullivan, 
supra note 189, at 64–70. For a detailed discussion of the Washington Supreme 
Court’s decision to reject the “plausibility” standard and the resulting implications 
for Washington state courts, see generally Michalski, supra note 189. 
 192.  Jurisdictions that have adopted the plausibility standard include: the 
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Maine, and South Dakota. See, e.g., Potomac 
Dev. Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 550 (D.C. 2011) (“Like the plaintiff 
in Iqbal, appellants would need to allege more by way of factual content to nudge 
[their claim] across the line from conceivable to plausible.” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18, ¶ 10, 939 
A.2d 676, 680 (adopting Twombly’s heightened pleading standard in a civil perjury 
case); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 889–90 (Mass. 2008) 
(“While we have concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient on the 
basis of the standard described in Nader v. Citron, we take the opportunity to adopt 
the refinement of that standard that was recently articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly.” (citations omitted)); Sisney v. Best 
Inc., 2008 SD 70, ¶¶ 7–8, 754 N.W.2d 804, 808–09 (noting the similarities between 
South Dakota’s pleading practice and the federal practice and deciding to adopt 
the “plausibility” standard).  
 193.  Prior to its decision in Walsh, the Minnesota Supreme Court had cited 
Twombly three times, but never formally adopted or rejected the “plausibility” 
standard. See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010); Hebert v. 
City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008); Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 
736 N.W.2d 619, 631 n.3 (Minn. 2007). The Minnesota Supreme Court had never 
cited Iqbal.  
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standard in favor of their traditional pleading practice.194 Still many 
others have yet to address the issue altogether.195 
Iqbal and the resulting divergence of pleading standards across 
this country have “shatter[ed] any remaining semblance of national 
procedural uniformity.”196 Procedural variation across jurisdictions, 
to be sure, is not a new phenomenon, as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were never universally embraced.197 Iqbal, however, has 
ushered a “new era of procedural diversity.”198 The Walsh court’s 
rejection of the “plausibility” standard presents both opportunities 
and cause for concern for Minnesota state courts. Both are 
addressed in turn. 
 
 194.  These jurisdictions include: Arizona, Delaware, Minnesota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 345 (Ariz. 2008) (“We granted review to dispel                 
any confusion as to whether Arizona has abandoned the notice pleading stan-  
dard . . . in favor of the recently articulated standard in [Twombly]. We hold that 
Rule 8, as previously interpreted by this Court, governs the sufficiency of claims for 
relief.”); Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital Partners III L.P., No. 363, 2011, 2012 
WL 172844, at *1 (Del. Jan. 20, 2012) (“[N]otwithstanding the holdings in Iqbal 
and Twombly, the governing pleading standard in Delaware . . . is reasonable 
conceivability.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Walsh 
III, 851 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Minn. 2014) (“We granted review in this case to decide a 
question of great interest and consequence to parties and their lawyers in civil 
cases: whether the plausibility standard announced in [Twombly] and [Iqbal] 
applies to civil pleadings in Minnesota state court. We conclude that it does not.”); 
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tenn. 
2011) (“We decline to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal ‘plausibility’ pleading  
standard . . . .”); Peak Alarm Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, ¶ 70 n.13, 
243 P.3d 1221, 1245 n.13 (Our holding here is not an indication that we adopt the 
Supreme Court’s plausibility standard.”); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 5 
n.1, 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (“[W]e have relied on the Conley standard for over 
twenty years, and . . . are unpersuaded . . . that we should now abandon it for a 
heightened standard.” (citations omitted)); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 
233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has 
recently heightened pleading requirements but declining to adopt the 
“plausibility” standard into its state practice); Roth v. DeFelicecare, 700 S.E.2d 183, 
189 n.4 (W. Va. 2010) (recognizing a heightened federal pleading standard but 
declining to adopt it in favor of the state’s traditional notice pleading standard).  
 195.  See Sullivan, supra note 189, at 64–70. 
 196.  Michalski, supra note 189, at 110. 
 197.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Sullivan, supra note 189, at 54 (discussing the twenty-three “replica jurisdictions” 
that have adopted the Federal Rules and noting there are an additional four 
jurisdictions which have incorporated the Federal Rules in statutory codes).  
 198.  Michalski, supra note 189, at 111. 
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A. Opportunities 
1. Protection of Our Adversarial System 
At the very foundation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is the idea that substantive law, not procedural technicalities, 
should define a litigant’s fate.199 The proverbial “day in court” 
principle that guided Charles E. Clark and the other drafters of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not new, however. David 
Dudley Field had envisioned the same in drafting the Field Code.200 
Central to this principle is the notion that trial by jury is the “gold 
standard” of our adversarial system.201 
In many ways, Twombly and Iqbal can be seen as reactions to a 
civil litigation system that no longer resembles the system in place 
when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated. 
Litigation at the time of enactment typically consisted of “a single 
plaintiff and a single defendant jousting about what usually were 
relatively simple matters.”202 Advancements in technology, science, 
civil rights, and the growth of our ever expanding and 
interconnected economy—both domestically and internationally—
have created a federal litigation system that is exceedingly 
complex.203 Enormous pressure has been placed on the federal 
courts to preserve efficiency within our existing procedural 
framework.204 To offset the trend of growing civil dockets filled with 
 
 199.  See, e.g., Clark, supra note 86, at 450 (“The requirements of pleading and 
allegation should not be strict, so that no person shall be deprived of his rights by 
the chance act or ignorance of his lawyer.”). 
 200.  See Field, supra note 47, at 262. 
The object of every suit . . . is to place the parties, whose rights are 
involved in it, in a proper and convenient manner, before the tribunal 
by which they are to be adjudicated; to present their conflicting 
allegations plainly and intelligibly to each other and to the Court; to 
secure by adequate means a trial or hearing of the contested points; to 
obtain a judgment or determination adapted to the justice of the case; 
and to effect the enforcement of that judgment by vigorous and 
efficient means. 
Id. 
 201.  Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials 
on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 
289–90 (2013).  
 202.  Id. at 290. 
 203.  Id. at 289–90. 
 204.  Id. at 296. 
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increasingly complex cases, the federal judiciary has arguably 
worked to give the existing rules more procedural bite. 
First came a trilogy of cases decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in its 1986 term addressing the summary judgment 
standard.205 The trilogy transformed the summary judgment 
motion, which had been left dormant for much of its history, into 
“a powerful tool for early resolution of litigation.”206 In the years 
since, much has been written about the actual effect of the trilogy 
on federal practice. However, one thing is clear: it has become 
more attractive for defendants to seek summary judgment as a tool 
to terminate cases before trial.207 In effect, the trilogy moved the 
goal line, demanding more of plaintiffs earlier in the litigation life 
cycle.208 Twombly and Iqbal finished the job, placing a greater 
burden on the plaintiff at the earliest stage of litigation—
pleading.209 
For better or worse, Iqbal and Twombly mark a decidedly 
different path than the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure envisioned.210 Trial by jury—the “gold standard” of our 
civil justice system—for many litigants has vanished.211 Most 
 
 205.  These cases are often referred to as the “Celotex Trilogy” and include: 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986); and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). For an in-depth discussion of the “Celotex Trilogy” and the resulting 
implications, see generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court 
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).  
 206.  Miller, supra note 205, at 984. 
 207.  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (“The three 
decisions in one term sent a clear signal to the legal profession that Rule 56 
provides a useful mechanism for disposing of cases short of trial when the district 
judge feels the plaintiff’s case is not plausible. Many courts responded to this 
invitation with considerable receptivity.”). 
 208.  See Miller, supra note 205, at 984. 
 209.  Miller, supra note 207, at 15 (“With Twombly and Iqbal, the favored 
disposition technique has moved earlier in time from summary judgment to the 
motion to dismiss.”).  
 210.  See supra notes 85–106 and accompanying text. 
 211.  See Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s 
Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 591 
(2010); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial 
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 518–19 (2010); Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, LITIG., 
Winter 2004, at 1, 1–2 (noting that federal courts tried fewer civil cases in 2002 
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troubling are Twombly and Iqbal’s implications in employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases, where the defendant is 
typically in possession of the evidence necessary to establish the 
claim.212 As Professor Arthur R. Miller noted in discussing 
employment discrimination claims in a post-Iqbal world, “How does 
the plaintiff show discriminatory conduct let alone a pattern of 
discrimination—whether it’s race, gender, age, or disability—
without access to the history of the employer’s conduct regarding 
other employees?”213 Liberal discovery, as provided by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure during the Conley era, was key to the 
plaintiff gathering the necessary evidence in Professor Miller’s 
hypothetical.214 Under the “plausibility” standard, these claims are 
more difficult to establish.215 
Twombly and Iqbal have fashioned a federal civil justice system 
increasingly concerned with efficiency and earlier case disposition 
based on less information.216 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Walsh preserves Minnesota’s adversarial system in the 
way the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envisioned. 
By rejecting the “plausibility” standard, the Walsh court’s decision 
better ensures that substantive law, not procedural hurdles, will 
continue to determine a litigant’s fate in Minnesota state courts. 
 
than they did in 1962, despite a fivefold increase in the number of filings). 
 212.  See generally Schneider, supra note 211 (discussing the “disparate impact” 
Twombly and Iqbal have had on litigants in civil rights and employment 
discrimination cases). 
 213.  Miller, supra note 211, at 596–97. 
 214.  See, e.g., id. at 588. 
 215.  See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal 
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (noting a significant increase 
in the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted in employment discrimination 
and civil rights cases post-Iqbal); Miller, supra note 211, at 596–97; Schneider, supra 
note 211, at 524–25 (“In virtually every phase of the [litigation] process, now 
ranging from pleading to appeals, there appears to be a disparate impact on 
employment discrimination and civil rights cases.”).  
 216.  Miller, supra note 211, at 596; Schneider, supra note 211, at 518; see also A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 479 (2008) (“The 
Twombly standard is troubling because . . . the Court appears to have exalted goals 
of sound judicial administration and efficiency above the original core concern of 
the rules: progressive reform in favor of expanding litigant access to justice.”).   
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2. Consistency and Avoidance of the Judicial Discretion Problem 
One of the many criticisms leveled at Twombly and Iqbal is that 
the “plausibility” standard gives judges too much discretion in 
controlling a claim’s fate.217 Iqbal outlined a two-step method aimed 
at determining whether a complaint satisfied the new standard.218 
In applying the “plausibility” standard, Justice Kennedy wrote, 
judges are first to distinguish legal conclusions from factual 
allegations, accepting only the latter as true.219 Next, drawing on 
their “judicial experience and common sense,” they are to 
determine whether the nonconclusory factual allegations—
accepted as true—give rise to a plausible claim for relief.220 
Legal commentators were quick to question the veracity of this 
two-step approach noting, “‘judicial experience and common 
sense’ [are] highly ambiguous and subjective concepts largely 
devoid of accepted—let alone universal—meaning.”221 As            
one district court judge remarked in the wake of Twombly,                  
“We . . . suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over 
something we thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: 
dispose of a motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim.”222 
Predictably, federal courts have applied the “plausibility” standard 
inconsistently.223 
The federal pleading standard, once “uniform dogma,” has 
been “fragmented on a circuit-by-circuit—or sometimes a judge-by-
judge—basis.”224 Central to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
the goal of consistency in the application of substantive law.225 In a 
post-Iqbal world, it is more likely that virtually identical complaints 
would garner different outcomes based on the subjective views of 
individual judges as to what allegations are plausible.226 
 
 217.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 207, at 22 (“[P]lausibility pleading . . . has 
granted virtually unbridled discretion to district court judges.”). 
 218.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 679. 
 221.  Miller, supra note 207, at 26. 
 222.  Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 853 
(2008). 
 223.  See id. at 858–61. 
 224.  Id. at 853. 
 225.  See supra notes 85–106 and accompanying text. 
 226.  Miller, supra note 207, at 30. 
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By rejecting the “plausibility” standard, Minnesota state courts 
avoid this pervasive judicial discretion problem. The decision also 
protects one of the core concerns of the Federal Rules—promoting 
open access to the court system for litigants. Further, the Walsh 
court’s decision promotes consistency in the application of 
substantive law, as Minnesota state courts have the benefit of nearly 
sixty years of established precedent interpreting Rule 8.01’s plain 
language. Thus, by continuing to interpret Rule 8.01 in ostensibly 
the same manner as when the rule was adopted in 1951, the Walsh 
court’s decision fosters stability and transparency in the court 
system. 
B. Concerns 
1. Lack of Uniformity and Forum Shopping 
Procedural uniformity, among the federal courts and among 
the federal and state courts operating intrastate, was a goal 
entrenched in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.227 Uniformity—
it was believed—would better promote the consistent application of 
substantive law, foster fairness and efficiency, and discourage forum 
shopping.228 At the core of the uniformity movement was the 
notion that, regardless of the forum selected or the judge 
presiding, similarly situated litigants should obtain the same 
result.229 
States that once embraced national uniformity, post-Iqbal, have 
set off in divergent directions,230 diminishing the “remaining 
 
 227.  See, e.g., Clark, supra note 86, at 449.  
It is thought that the country is now more ready for uniformity than at 
any earlier time . . . . The one single system envisaged by the [Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure] will not seem greatly different from the 
procedures of most, if not all, of the states, but will appear, as it is, 
merely the logical extension of already existing state practice systems. 
Id. 
 228.  See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and Tension with 
Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 860 (1988). 
 229.  See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: 
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making 
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1191 (2005); see also Miller, supra note 207, at 5 
(“The Rules were intended to support a central philosophical principle: the 
procedural system of the federal courts should be premised on equality of 
treatment of all parties and claims in the civil adjudication process.”).  
 230.  See supra notes 189–95 and accompanying text. 
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/2
  
1684 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:5 
semblance of national procedural uniformity.”231 In a post-Iqbal 
world, forum shopping is an increasingly worthy concern. 
Procedural variation between state and federal courts, in fact, 
encourages forum shopping. 
Under the Erie doctrine, Minnesota’s federal courts sitting in a 
diversity action would apply the federal (i.e. plausibility), not state 
(i.e., notice) pleading standard.232 Thus, plaintiffs “not constrained 
by” issues of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are 
encouraged to file in Minnesota state courts, thereby avoiding the 
heightened federal standard.233 
A reverse-Erie analysis presents a similar issue. In a federal 
subject-matter case filed in Minnesota state court, state procedures 
would govern, provided the procedures do not “impose 
unnecessary burdens” on federal rights.234 In Brown v. Western 
Railway of Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that 
states may not apply local, heightened pleading standards when 
adjudicating federal claims.235 Whether states can apply a lower 
pleading standard—as would be the case in Minnesota post-
Walsh236—is a question left unresolved. Since the application of a 
less rigorous pleading standard would support, not restrict, the 
attainment of federal rights, it likely conforms to Brown’s central 
holding.237 As such, forum shopping is a viable concern in 
Minnesota post-Walsh in both Erie and reverse-Erie situations. 
Since 2006, several empirical studies have been conducted to 
determine the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on both the success of 
motions to dismiss under the plausibility standard and on removal 
 
 231.  Michalski, supra note 189, at 110. To be sure, national uniformity was 
never obtained, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not universally 
embraced. However, this Note argues that Twombly and Iqbal mark the end of what 
was a limited system of uniformity created in the seventy years after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted.  
 232.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (discussing Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Under Hanna, if a state procedural rule and a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure conflict, the federal rule prevails, provided that it 
conforms with federal law and the Constitution. Id. at 463–65; see also Michalski, 
supra note 189, at 115–17. 
 233.  See Michalski, supra note 189, at 109, 121 (discussing a similar dynamic in 
Washington after the Washington Supreme Court rejected the “plausibility” 
standard in favor of its traditional pleading practice).  
 234.  See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949). 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Walsh III, 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014). 
 237.  See id.; Brown, 338 U.S. at 298–99. 
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rates—an indicator used to determine the prevalence of forum 
shopping.238 Almost universally, studies show some increase, 
whether statistically significant or not, in the number of motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim filed in federal courts post-Iqbal, 
and the success of those motions.239 The data on removal rates, 
however, is less prevalent or clear. 
One study published in 2013 focused solely on the question of 
whether an increase in removal rates had occurred post-Twombly 
and Iqbal.240 The study examined monthly removal rates (i.e., the 
rate at which defendants removed litigation filed in state courts to 
federal courts) across all fifty states and the District of Columbia, 
during two periods: before and after Twombly and Iqbal.241 Contrary 
to the researchers’ expectations, no clear trend of an increase in 
removal rates post-Twombly and Iqbal emerged242—suggesting that, 
in practice, forum shopping has not become the problem feared by 
many legal commentators.243 
One potential explanation for the absence of an upward trend 
in removal rates may be a preexisting preference for the federal 
court system (pre-Twombly and Iqbal) among defense attorneys.244 
This perceived preference is believed to be especially true for 
corporate and business-related entities.245 As such, it is possible that 
defense attorneys would choose to remove a case to federal court 
whenever possible—even without the prospect of a heightened 
pleading standard. Twombly and Iqbal, however, have certainly made 
 
 238.  More than twenty studies analyzing the empirical impact of Twombly and 
Iqbal (“Twiqbal”) have been published. For a discussion of several of these studies, 
see generally David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of 
Civil Procedure, 65 STAN L. REV. 1203, 1204 n.7 (2013). 
 239.  For an overview of eight leading studies assessing the impact of Twombly 
and Iqbal, see Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly and Iqbal Affecting Where 
Plaintiffs File? A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 827, 
841–48 (2013). 
 240.  Id. at 849 n.5. 
 241.  Id. at 868. 
 242.  Id. at 872.  
 243.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 207, at 83. 
 244.  Curry & Ward, supra note 239, at 872. 
 245.  See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It 
Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 
248–49, 297 (2008) (“[It is] conventional wisdom that plaintiffs fare better in state 
court and defendants, [who often possess corporate and business interests], fare 
better in federal court. Empirical data comparing win-rates and recoveries in state 
and federal court support this notion.”). 
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this proposition more attractive. Of course, the number of cases 
that can actually be removed to federal court is circumscribed, as a 
case needs to either invoke a federal question or satisfy both the 
diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements.246 
As the authors of the study note, further research in a post-
Iqbal world is needed.247 Yet the study, however limited, provides at 
least incremental evidence that where federal-state procedural 
variation exists, forum shopping—despite its potential post-Iqbal 
appeal—has not, as predicted, become more prevalent.248 In 
Minnesota, time will tell if the Walsh court’s decision to reject the 
plausibility standard will lead to an increase in forum shopping.249 
At the moment, however, it appears that the concern, if any, is 
minimal. 
2. Discovery Abuse and the Cost of Litigation 
The impetus behind the plausibility standard can be traced, in 
large part, to the “drumbeat” of concern over the perceived 
abundance of frivolous lawsuits, abusive discovery practices, and 
the growing cost of litigation.250 These concerns are certainly not 
new. Much ink has been spilled on these subjects since the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure were proposed.251 It is clear that the liberal 
ethos of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has transformed 
 
 246.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)(1)–(4) (2012).  
 247.  Curry & Ward, supra note 239, at 872. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Walsh III, 851 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Minn. 2014). 
 250.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 207, at 9; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible 
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery 
process through careful case management . . . given the . . . success of judicial 
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON 
DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM, FINAL 
REPORT 2–3 (2009). See generally Miller, supra note 205, at 984 (discussing the 
“loudly trumpeted” but unproven claims of an explosion in excessive and frivolous 
litigation and the accompanying perceived costs). 
 251.  See, e.g., Finch, supra note 107, at 809 (arguing that the liberal pleading 
standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would lead to frivolous and 
speculative litigation); James A. Pike, Objections to Pleadings Under the New Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L. J. 50, 71–72 (1937) (arguing that the liberal 
pleading requirements under the Federal Rules will lead to needless delay and 
expense). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 
635–37 (1989). 
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American litigation over the past seventy-five years. An increasingly 
complex and interconnected economy and the birth of e-discovery 
have certainly played a role as well.252 
Whether these concerns present a serious risk to the federal 
court system or whether they are overstated is a debate that rages 
on and is one beyond the scope of this Note. What is clear, 
however, is that Twombly and Iqbal are just the latest in a series of 
Supreme Court decisions that have “favored increasingly early case 
disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of 
abusive and meritless lawsuits.”253 The liberal ethos of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in many ways, has been replaced by a 
fairly constricted one.254 
Twombly and Iqbal follow what has been characterized as an 
unsuccessful attempt to establish more effective pre-trial case 
management255 and rein in the “discovery problem” through the 
rulemaking process.256 Federal Rules 16 and 26 have both been 
amended several times in the past quarter century to address their 
perceived shortcomings.257 The effectiveness of these changes, 
however, has been questioned. Justice Souter, writing for the 
majority in Twombly, opined: “[T]he success of judicial supervision 
in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”258 With 
Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court indicated that the 
rulemaking process has been deficient in fixing what the Court’s 
majority viewed as serious problems affecting the federal system.259 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also taken affirmative steps 
to address these prevailing concerns but has opted for legislative 
reform over judicial interpretation. In November 2010, the court 
established the Civil Justice Reform Task Force.260 The Task Force 
 
 252.  See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 253.  Miller, supra note 207, at 9–10.  
 254.  Id. 
 255.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 256.  See id. R. 26.  
 257.  Rule 16 was amended in 1983 and 1993. Id. R. 16. Rule 26 was amended 
in 1993, 2000, and 2006. Id. R. 26. For more information about the amendments, 
see id. R. 16 advisory committee notes and id. R. 26 advisory committee notes. 
 258.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). Justice Stevens’ 
dissenting opinion argued that Justice Souter and the Twombly majority “vastly 
underestimate[d] a district court’s case-management arsenal.” Id. at 593 n.13 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 259.  See Miller, supra note 207, at 94–95.  
 260.  Order Establishing Civil Justice Reform Task Force, ADM10-8051 (Minn. 
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was ordered to recommend changes aimed at facilitating the 
efficient and cost-effective processing of all civil cases in the state.261 
In its final report submitted in December 2011, the Task Force 
provided several recommendations, including the integration of a 
proportionality consideration for discovery, the adoption of an 
expedited procedure for nondispositive motions, an expedited 
litigation track pilot program, and the Complex Case Program.262 
Based on the recommendations, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
directed the Task Force to prepare the proposed rule changes, 
which were submitted in a May 2012 supplemental report.263 On 
February 4, 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued 
amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
General Rules of Practice for the District Courts.264 
The amendments, which took effect July 1, 2013,265 adopted 
many of the Task Force’s recommendations, including adding a 
proportionality determination into the scope of discovery,266 
compelling automatic disclosures,267 requiring attorneys to prepare 
a discovery plan,268 and creating an expedited process for 
nondispositive motions.269 Arguably, the biggest advancement is the 
creation of the Complex Case Program.270 
Under the Complex Case Program, certain cases are 
designated as “complex” early in the litigation process to promote 
more effective judicial management, avoid unnecessary delay and 
expense, and foster the efficient administration of justice.271 
Notably, antitrust claims, like the one at issue in Twombly, are 
 
Nov. 24, 2010). 
 261.  Id. at 1. 
 262.  MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL         
REPORT 17–31 (2011), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2012/other             
/120214.pdf. 
 263.  MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT (2012), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public 
/Court_Information_Office/Civil_Justice_Ref_Task_Force_Supp_Rpt_May_2012.pdf. 
 264.  Order Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and 
General Rules of Practice Relating to the Civil Justice Reform Task Force, ADM10  
-8051, ADM09-8009, ADM04-8001 (Minn. Feb. 4, 2013). 
 265.  Id. at 1. 
 266.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 267.  Id. R. 26.01.  
 268.  Id. R. 26.06(c). 
 269.  MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 115.04(d). 
 270.  Id. R. 146. 
 271.  Id. R. 146.01. 
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presumptively designated as complex.272 Complex cases are subject 
to a more rigorous set of pre-trial management standards.273 
In practice, it will take time to determine if the recent changes 
to Minnesota’s procedural system, particularly the Complex Case 
Program, help better achieve the goal announced in Rule 1 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure—“the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every civil action.”274 For now, the 
changes appear to be a more just solution than what was handed 
down in Twombly and Iqbal. 
Unlike the federal system in the wake of Iqbal, which broadly 
requires heightened pleadings in all civil actions regardless of their 
complexity, Minnesota’s solution attempts to directly address the 
problem—identifying complex cases early in their life cycle—and 
works to ensure their just resolution without needless delay or 
expense. By maintaining the liberal ethos imbedded in the notice 
pleading system, Minnesota state courts are better positioned to 
facilitate the founding principles of our modern civil justice system, 
promoting public access to the courts and ensuring equality among 
all litigants. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Walsh, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to adopt the 
“plausibility” pleading standard, placing Minnesota’s pleading 
practice in direct conflict with the federal system in the wake of 
Twombly and Iqbal. As this Note argues, however, the notice 
 
 272.  The following types of claims are considered presumptively complex 
under the Complex Case Program:  
(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims; (2) Intellectual property 
matters, such as trade secrets, copyrights, patents, etc.;                        
(3) Construction defect claims involving many parties or structures;  
(4) Securities claims or investment losses involving many parties;       
(5) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving many parties;           
(6) Product liability claims; (7) Claims involving mass torts; (8) Claims 
involving class actions; (9) Ownership or control of business claims; or 
(10) Insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the claims listed in 
(c)(1) through (c)(9). 
Id. R. 146.02(c)(1)–(10). 
 273.  These standards include: the assignment of a single judge based on the 
judge’s ability, interest, and experience with complex cases; a mandatory case 
management conference; and strict scheduling orders for all subsequent 
procedural devices and proceedings. Id. R. 146.03–.05. 
 274.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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pleading system, as preserved by the Walsh court, better protects 
the founding principles of our modern civil justice system—
promoting open access to the courts and equal treatment of 
litigants.275 Furthermore, the Walsh court’s decision better ensures 
consistency in the application of substantive law—avoiding the 
pervasive judicial discretion problem imbedded in the federal 
system in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal.276 To be sure, a lack of 
procedural uniformity between the federal and state courts can 
create problems.277 However, the most significant potential issue—
forum shopping—appears, at the moment, to be of minimal 
concern. 
It will take time to determine if the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s recent efforts to address the efficiency of the court system 
through the rule making process foster a more efficient and cost-
effective system. For now, Minnesota’s effort to tackle the 
“efficiency problem” through the Rules presents a more just 
solution than what was handed down in Twombly and Iqbal. 
 
 
 275.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 276.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 277.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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